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CRM is Dead

FORUM

CRM IS DEAD
Cass Howell

CRM is dead, at least in the U.S. No one killed it; it just passed on fiom natural causes, exacerbated by the
evolution of the aviation industry, society and world politics. It was wonderfully useful in its heyday, and we as
aviation professionals all owe a debt of gratitude to those responsible for its creation and implementation. They
were truly visionaries.
So what happened to Crew Resource
Management? Many things, both good and bad, but about
a halfdozen factors combined to cause its demise. The
first and perhaps most powehl influence on CRM was
the consequences of the naturai lifespan of many, if not
all, business, education and social movements. A review
of history will demonstrate that many movements have a
natural liiespan of about twenty years, plus or minus five.
Examples of this abound and include the Temperance and
the Civil Rights eras, the quality improvement push in the
automobile industry (anyone remember Total Quality
Management?), any number of psychological therapies
(psychoanalysis, behavior modification, humanistic
theory, etc.). If the movement was not well grounded in
fact or in demonstrated value the cycle (birth to death)
could be much shorter. So it should not surprise us that
CRM has reached the end of its life-cycle; indeed, we
should expect it.'
Having said this, it should be recognized that the
single most influential event in accelerating the end of
CRM was the attacks of September 11, 2001. These
attacks, as everyone knows, were catastrophic to U.S.
airlines in a number of ways. The most important to
CRM was the immediate financial crisis that ensued in the
airline industry. One after the other, almost all of the
major caniers either went into bankruptcy or to the brink
Even our wars seem to be on a similar generational
cycle, beginning with the Spanish-American War to
World War I (19 years), World War I to World War II (23
years), World War I1 to the Vietnam War (20 years),
Vietnam War to Desert Storm (17 years). Only the
Korean War does not fit that interval sequence. Since
Desert Storm we seem to have entered a state of more or
less continuous warfare.
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of it. This financial crisis cut the legs fiom CRM,
eviscerating it as management sought ways to draw down
on training and all other costs. When airline is taking
those little passenger pillows of its aircraft in order to
reduce weight, and thus fuel expense, it is difficult to
rationalize spending twenty million dollars annually on
CRM training. When personal retirement accounts are
reduced to pennies on the dollar so that the carrier can
stay in business a little longer, there is immense pressure
to find ways to do everything, including CRM, vastly
cheaper, just barely enough to meet the letter of the law.
Although all company representatives will insist, "We
would never do anything to compromise safety," it is very
difficult to believe that watching a training DVD on a
computer for a few hours will equally supplant 2-3 days
of personalized live instruction fiom experienced line
crewmembers. While all carriers have not gotten to this
dismal point, it is quite clearly where things are headed.
To some extent CRM has been a victim of its
own success. The imperious Captain of old, whom 1* and
2" officers more feared than respected, has largely been
supplanted by a generation who have never known
anything other than a crew-concept flying team, thus the
driving force for the establishment of CRM has largely
faded. The Captain's once unquestioned (literally)
authority, argue many, has been further eroded by greater
decision making latitude on the part of ATC, dispatchers,
and even gate agents. Add to this more oversight in the
form of coclcpit voice and data recorders and FOQA, and
now the Captain's throne is not so grand. Even
automation often serves to place the Captain in the role of
just confirming the FMC's recommendation, rather than
making original decisions. Indeed, in Airbus aircraft the
Captain (and others) is actively precluded h m some
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actions. All of this, in combination, reduces the powerdistance relationship that CRM sought to bridge, thus
lessening its perceived need.
In addition to this egalitarian trend, CRM has
lost much of its visibility. Not only has it been integrated
anonymously into regular training, but the giants of the
CRM movement, such as Lauber, Helmreich, Wiener, and
Foushee have mostly retired or moved on to other
research areas. Where is the next generation of advocates
(zealots?) who will champion the progress of CRM? Is
there anyone under age 60 who is a big name in the field?
This lack of institutional and practitioner energy
is reflected in the dearth of active research and publication
in the field, including FAA and NASA funding for such.
It is equally apparent by the lack of forums that actively
focus on and promote CRM. In a survey of over 100
aviation or academic research related conferences
scheduled as of this writing, only one (Embry-Riddle's
CRM Vectors Conference) included CRM in the title.
While everyone recognizes that the application of good
Human Factors techniques are still needed, the trend is to
devote money and effort towards alternate programs, for
example the Global War on E m r initiative, at the expense

of CRM. This is in keeping with the aforementioned
lifecycle concept, whereby movements are usually
supplanted by "the latest and greatest," solution
(hopefully) to age old problems.
Interestingly, Europe in particular and the rest of
the world in general have been much less affected by
these trends. To some degree this is because they got a
later start, and thus the lifecycle is at the near end; another
h r is that foreign carriers were not as devastated by the
9-1 1 aftermath as were U.S. airlines, thus CRM research
and implementation continue to progress. As a result, in
other locations CRM as a safety program has actually
advanced beyond where it stagnated in the United States.
Also, CRM variants in the nuclear, medical and other
o&hoot fields continue to evolve in a positive direction
for the same reasons.
None of the aforementioned points is intended to
lessen or undermine the contributions of CRM and its
practioners to aviation safety. It succeeded because it was
effective, timely and achievable.
Let's hope its
replacement is even more so..)
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